BBC Banned From Reporting On "cash For Honours"

I don't know how anyone could've imagined there being any WMD in Iraq if the worst Saddam could hurl at Israel, Saudi Arabia (and in error, one at Bahrain) during the Gulf War proper were SCUDS! Come on, guys, these things date back decades, are notoriously difficult to land on target, and in spite of us being told (in Saudi) at the time that he MAY have loaded the nosecones with Sarin or Tabun, there was never the hint that he had any nuclear capability. So, a few years later, and after intense satellite supervision, AWACS overflights from Saudi Arabia and any other amount of spying through the airwaves, he - having just had his tanks wrecked or impounded, his army savaged, 36,000 men fleeing into Saudi for asylum (imagine how desperate you'd have to be!), and his cities and airports battered, all kinds of embargoes in place, he begins - of all things - a serious WMD programme. With funding from whom or through what?? He couldn't sell his oil, so where did the money come from?

Now, with all those cute little satellites winking in the sky, which can detect those naughty North Koreans peeling the decals off the sealed doors of their own supposed nuclear facility, you mean to tell me they couldn't see signs of WMD being produced in Iraq? You don't even have to contend with peering through heavy cloud, rain, fog, or snow in order to spy on the damn country! Helloooo... a baby milk factory? You mean to tell me that a milk bottling plant looks just like a nuclear missile base? No wonder the Americans blast friendly troops to bits every now and then. Their 'Intelligence' service is just about as reliable.
 
The intelligence services were supplying pretty much correct information - the governments on both sides of the Atlantic chose to bend it as it didn't suit their purposes.
 
For anyone who is not familiar with what has become known as the "Downing Street Memo" here it is in full. The bold red highlights were added by me. Note the date, 23rd July 2002. The weapons inspectors' final reports were way in the future. The war started on March 19th 2003.

SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL - UK EYES ONLY

DAVID MANNING
From: Matthew Rycroft
Date: 23 July 2002
S 195 /02

cc: Defence Secretary, Foreign Secretary, Attorney-General, Sir Richard Wilson, John Scarlett, Francis Richards, CDS, C, Jonathan Powell, Sally Morgan, Alastair Campbell

IRAQ: PRIME MINISTER'S MEETING, 23 JULY

Copy addressees and you met the Prime Minister on 23 July to discuss Iraq.
This record is extremely sensitive. No further copies should be made. It should be shown only to those with a genuine need to know its contents.

John Scarlett summarised the intelligence and latest JIC assessment. Saddam's regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way to overthrow it was likely to be by massive military action. Saddam was worried and expected an attack, probably by air and land, but he was not convinced that it would be immediate or overwhelming. His regime expected their neighbours to line up with the US. Saddam knew that regular army morale was poor. Real support for Saddam among the public was probably narrowly based.

C reported on his recent talks in Washington. There was a perceptible shift in attitude. Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN route, and no enthusiasm for publishing material on the Iraqi regime's record. There was little discussion in Washington of the aftermath after military action.

CDS said that military planners would brief CENTCOM on 1-2 August, Rumsfeld on 3 August and Bush on 4 August.

The two broad US options were:

(a) Generated Start. A slow build-up of 250,000 US troops, a short (72 hour) air campaign, then a move up to Baghdad from the south. Lead time of 90 days (30 days preparation plus 60 days deployment to Kuwait).

(b) Running Start. Use forces already in theatre (3 x 6,000), continuous air campaign, initiated by an Iraqi casus belli. Total lead time of 60 days with the air campaign beginning even earlier. A hazardous option.

The US saw the UK (and Kuwait) as essential, with basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus critical for either option. Turkey and other Gulf states were also important, but less vital. The three main options for UK involvement were:

(i) Basing in Diego Garcia and Cyprus, plus three SF squadrons.

(ii) As above, with maritime and air assets in addition.

(iii) As above, plus a land contribution of up to 40,000, perhaps with a discrete role in Northern Iraq entering from Turkey, tying down two Iraqi divisions.

The Defence Secretary said that the US had already begun "spikes of activity" to put pressure on the regime. No decisions had been taken, but he thought the most likely timing in US minds for military action to begin was January, with the timeline beginning 30 days before the US Congressional elections.

The Foreign Secretary said he would discuss this with Colin Powell this week. It seemed clear that Bush had made up his mind to take military action, even if the timing was not yet decided. But the case was thin. Saddam was not threatening his neighbours, and his WMD capability was less than that of Libya, North Korea or Iran. We should work up a plan for an ultimatum to Saddam to allow back in the UN weapons inspectors. This would also help with the legal justification for the use of force.

The Attorney-General said that the desire for regime change was not a legal base for military action. There were three possible legal bases: self-defence, humanitarian intervention, or UNSC authorisation. The first and second could not be the base in this case. Relying on UNSCR 1205 of three years ago would be difficult. The situation might of course change.

The Prime Minister said that it would make a big difference politically and legally if Saddam refused to allow in the UN inspectors. Regime change and WMD were linked in the sense that it was the regime that was producing the WMD. There were different strategies for dealing with Libya and Iran. If the political context were right, people would support regime change. The two key issues were whether the military plan worked and whether we had the political strategy to give the military plan the space to work.

On the first, CDS said that we did not know yet if the US battleplan was workable. The military were continuing to ask lots of questions.

For instance, what were the consequences, if Saddam used WMD on day one, or if Baghdad did not collapse and urban warfighting began? You said that Saddam could also use his WMD on Kuwait. Or on Israel, added the Defence Secretary.

The Foreign Secretary thought the US would not go ahead with a military plan unless convinced that it was a winning strategy. On this, US and UK interests converged. But on the political strategy, there could be US/UK differences. Despite US resistance, we should explore discreetly the ultimatum. Saddam would continue to play hard-ball with the UN.

John Scarlett assessed that Saddam would allow the inspectors back in only when he thought the threat of military action was real.

The Defence Secretary said that if the Prime Minister wanted UK military involvement, he would need to decide this early. He cautioned that many in the US did not think it worth going down the ultimatum route. It would be important for the Prime Minister to set out the political context to Bush.

Conclusions:

(a) We should work on the assumption that the UK would take part in any military action. But we needed a fuller picture of US planning before we could take any firm decisions. CDS should tell the US military that we were considering a range of options.

(b) The Prime Minister would revert on the question of whether funds could be spent in preparation for this operation.

© CDS would send the Prime Minister full details of the proposed military campaign and possible UK contributions by the end of the week.

(d) The Foreign Secretary would send the Prime Minister the background on the UN inspectors, and discreetly work up the ultimatum to Saddam.

He would also send the Prime Minister advice on the positions of countries in the region especially Turkey, and of the key EU member states.

(e) John Scarlett would send the Prime Minister a full intelligence update.

(f) We must not ignore the legal issues: the Attorney-General would consider legal advice with FCO/MOD legal advisers.

(I have written separately to commission this follow-up work.)

MATTHEW RYCROFT

(Rycroft was a Downing Street foreign policy aide)
 
I'm sure you'll find the weapons inspectors produced a series of reports Brian, culminating in a final one. It's my understanding that by the Autumn of 1997 it had been pretty well established that they had little left by way of WMD capacity in Iraq itself, and what they thought might still exist was really the sort of low grade stuff that most countries are capable of manufacturing in line with any pharmecutical industry, and can be produced in a university lab to small quantities. In other words your talking about low grade gas or viruses, which would doubtless ruin your day if you had the personal misfortune to encounter them, but were incapable of being incorporated into any meaningful arsenal, let alone fired half way around the world in 45 minutes time. This whole notion of "weapons of mass destruction" was something of a misnomer, you really weren't talking about things too far removed from the trenches of the Ypres Salient

With this in mind, it's my understanding that something of a paper chase developed from about 1998 onwards as the fear that took over was that they had somehow spirited low grade weapons overseas with agents etc and placed them inside the countries most likely to pose a them a threat, hence reversing what was then conventional thinking, that the threat had to come from outside rather than internally. This broad idea duly came to pass of course. Again, I can only draw on what I was told by someone, and believe I can quote them pretty accurately from memory (as one tends to remember these things)

"You can carry anthrax in a bottle of volvic, and move it round the world quite easily"..... This led to another disclosure which I'm not quite so verbatim on, but was something to the effect of

"Look how many light airfields there are around every major American city. You only need a few crop sparyers and an appointed time, and you could have planes over most major cities within 15 minutes"

I believe they considered this threat to be plausible at the time though, but for whatever reason (probably a combination of paper chasing, and an evaluation of the technical threat in terms of quantities and likely impact etc) led to it seemingly being dismissed.
 
I've been unamused to read tonight that Al Gore, he of 'An Inconvenient Truth' is guilty of spending $30,000 a year on his electricity bills for his TWENTY ROOM mansion in Tennessee - TWENTY TIMES more than the average American!

The Republican Party smear campaign kicked in quickly post Oscars, didn't it?
 
Brian. I'd love to put you right on the injunction story. But, alas for obvious legal reasons, I can't say what I know. I have a mortgage and job to worry about.
 
Gareth, I've quoted the Gore household electricity usage from this week's 'This Week', which is an Indie magazine sourcing stories from all major news media around the world. Don't worry, they kick Donkeys just as much as they slap Elephants.
 
The original source was the Tennessee Center for Policy Research, who claim to be non-partisan. Their president is a guy called Drew Johnson: http://tennesseepolicy.org/main/article.php?article_id=89

As you can see there, he used to work at the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research.

Now, what's this here on Exxon's website where they disclose their donations:

http://216.239.59.104/search?q=cache:ZhAL7...2&client=safari

American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C.
Annual Dinner* 5,000
General Operating Support 235,000

That's $240,000 that Exxon have donated to this group. In fact, they've funded the AEI to the tune of $1.6m over the last ten years.

(BTW the link given there is from Google's cache, as Exxon appear to have removed their "Giving Reports" from their website...)
 
Originally posted by cheltboy@Mar 3 2007, 04:59 PM
Brian. I'd love to put you right on the injunction story. But, alas for obvious legal reasons, I can't say what I know. I have a mortgage and job to worry about.
I think I know. My media source tells me that the report was about a possibly incriminating email sent from a lady to a gentleman, whom I guess we should keep nameless at the moment.
 
Then gentlemen please keep it to yourselves for the moment . I don't want to see Col done for contempt !
 
I know nowt about what was in the E-mail but my guess is it went something like this:

From : Amelia Fawcett-Brown to T Blair; The Funding Committee;

Subject: PFP Plan.Section H-K.


As requested by the Committee I initiated the calling plan for my allocated section.
Unfortunately on my very first call I encountered a problem which I will relate as it might be relevant to future calls made by other assistants.

When I initially informed the individual that we proposed that he become a Peer he was quite positive and felt he deserved such recognition. He was however disappointed that he had to be Banstead and not, as he preferred, Cheltenham though he finally agreed.
The problem arose when I asked him to send a cheque for the minimum amount directly to the Party's account. He became largely incoherent and I could only understand part of his response.

As a result of this conversation i would make the the following observations:-

i) Even though not one of us I believe this individual was offended by being asked to commit such a small amount. Action: We should revisit and probably increase the minimum so as not to upset similar arrivistes.

ii)He seemed to recommend the we speak to Fukov (sp.) who is playing games with soldiers up the Khyber. Action; Check whether we can offer Peerages to emigres.

I will await your response before making further calls.

A F-B.
 
And an attempted cover up is the conclusion drawn from the contents (allegedly). I wonder if anyone is going evens about charges being brought?
 
If anyone was convicted of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice they would go inside for sure. And Mr Tony's position would become untenable.
 
Good for you, judge.

Judge refuses to gag Guardian

Tuesday March 6, 2007
The Guardian


The Guardian last night successfully resisted an attempt by the attorney general, Lord Goldsmith, to prevent the publication of today's lead story.

The attorney's lawyers had wanted to stop the paper from running an article which they argued was similar to the story they prevented the BBC running last Friday.

They demanded an undertaking that we wouldn't publish this story, though the Guardian was given no explanation of why this was necessary, or the nature of the legal problem.

The attorney's office also threatened to apply to the court for an injunction that would have stopped the story. The Guardian resisted.

A high court judge then heard an urgent telephone application from a Treasury solicitor for an injunction.

The attorney general's lawyer said that although the Guardian story would not breach the existing court order, it may prejudice a possible criminal prosecution. The paper would therefore be in contempt of court. The Guardian's QC, Mr Andrew Nicol, argued that it would be highly unusual for an injunction to be granted under those terms when no charges had been brought. He said that the judge would have to be satisfied there was a substantial risk of serious prejudice to court proceedings.

Prosecutors have yet to receive the final files from Scotland Yard.

The judge said the case was finely balanced but she refused to accede to the attorney's request, saying that the story was already in the public domain because it was already being printed.

Alan Rusbridger, the Guardian's editor, said: "The Guardian was today given a significant story about the cash for honours inquiry which we checked both with Lord Levy and with the police. The story was well-sourced and clearly in the public interest. In this country there is a well-established principle that the state cannot exercise prior restraint on newspapers."
 
Oh, and the story is, for those who haven't yet picked up on it, that Ruth Turner, the prime minister's director of external relations, claimed that Lord Levy tried to influence evidence that might have been of interest to the police enquiry.
 
Never put anything incendiary on email. When will they learn.

(Soon to be Lord H - the email I sent recently on the intentions of a horse trainer recently was, of course, purely jocular in intent and I have prepaid a donation to a charity)
 
AC, you're down for the OBN already, so you can keep the grovelling sycophancy for later on, when the newly-elevated one will cast a basilisk eye upon all those who've failed to humour or amuse him these past years. :suspect:
 
Back
Top