Iran And The Holocaust

Originally posted by BrianH+Dec 12 2006, 06:14 PM--></div><table border='0' align='center' width='95%' cellpadding='3' cellspacing='1'><tr><td>QUOTE (BrianH @ Dec 12 2006, 06:14 PM)</td></tr><tr><td id='QUOTE'> <!--QuoteBegin-Grasshopper@Dec 12 2006, 05:58 PM
I take your point, and I ... (though to be honest, France and Belgium are a bit of a mystery).

No mystery - over 25% of both French and Belgian Jews died in the Holocaust. [/b][/quote]

I don't know about Belgium, but I believe the figure for France was considerably higher than 25%. I've read figures as high as 70% - contrasting with Italy, where over 75% survived. The numbers of European Jews killed varied enormously thoughout Europe according to the co-operation, or lack of it, of the local population in 'shopping' Jews to the Germans.

I've met several French Jews who were smuggled out as children and are the only surviving members of their families. Anti-Semitism was and still is engrained in the French, sad to say. I lived over 2 years in central France and have spent several long periods there besides, in both Paris and the Languedoc; and it's an aspect of the country I find hard to stomach - and not one you notice until you are pretty integrated socially.


Warbler added:

"...Stalin needed to industrialise, and to do it quickly. Unfortunately, the Kulak would rather burn grain and destroy food before they'd sell it to the government, so with millions dying of starvation in the cities of the Soviet Union, its not difficult to understand why Stalin did what he did."

Re the kulaks destroying food - there are two points to make here: firstly, most food for the Soviet Union esp the grain, was grown in the Ukraine, which considered itself an occupied country; secondly the Soviets were taking ALL the food, not leaving sufficient for the kulaks to feed their villages or even their own families. So at the time, destroying food rather than allowing the Soviets to take it all, was an act of patriotic defiance
 
headstrong

the figures for france were much higher when the ss demanded all jewish men over the age of 16 be deported the vichy goverment insisited that all jewish women and children were included in the deportations

this was in contrast to italy where the deportations were only started after the fall of mussolini ironically the only safe places for jews in both france and croatia were in the small areas occupied by italy italian troops in general refusing to hand them back to the authorities

many figures in the vichy regime continued in power after the war without punishment
 
Originally posted by Headstrong@Dec 21 2006, 04:45 PM
I don't know about Belgium, but I believe the figure for France was considerably higher than 25%. I've read figures as high as 70%.

the figures for france were much higher when the ss demanded all jewish men over the age of 16 be deported the vichy goverment insisited that all jewish women and children were included in the deportations

I'm never shy of quoting my sources and the 25% given above came directly from Rachel Steiner's History Tour of France one of many sections of the online Jewish Virtual Library. I doubt very much that they are too far out.

Here is the link to the library, should anyone be interested:

Jewish Virtual Library

And here is the link to the French History section:

Jewish Virtual Library - France
 
Originally posted by BrianH@Dec 14 2006, 03:09 PM
The Royal Navy would have had great difficulty in stopping all those German paratroopers if we had lost control of the air.
They'd have landed them in darkness predominantly, as the RAF's night fighting ability was limited. In any case, you only need to land a paratrooper once, where as a bombing campaign has to be sustained. It's questionable how many gliders or planes the RAF could have shot down in a series of all out night assaults. I'm sure they could have put an airborne assault together, and I'm equally sure they could have supplied it with light munitions and rations etc the gamble as Ardross says is whether they could have seized and maintained an operational port long enough to bring in the required level of heavy armour with which they'd been so successful in the Spring.

I tend to agree with Ardross, if they could have smashed across the Dover Straight, and maintain a supply line of heavy equipment for just a few days, backed up by lighter munitions from the air they could have undertaken a campaign against a depleted BEF, a lot of whom had left their hardware on the sands of Dunkirk. I think the results wouldn't have been massively dis-similar to Greece, where an airborne invasion worked, but at an unacceptable loss. It's a matter of the record now that Churchill was preparing to resort to anthrax and chemical weapons such was the degradation of our capacity

The Navy was kept largely out of range in Scapa Floe, and the Kreigsmarine was no real match for it especially as any battle would have been fought in the comparative narrow confimnes of the Channel, and negate their most powerful capital ships a bit, alot of which were designed for open sea long range artillery duels, and could have been over run by a numerically larger fleet of cruisers and destroyers operating at closer range, with lighter guns and torpedos. The problem of course is that this too would have exposed the RN to the Luftwaffe, which would have resulted in horrendous losses.

That the Germans elected to try and starve us into submission by waging a U Boat campaign made sense. All this time of course they could have mobilsed the industrial spoils of France, Holland, Belgium etc to build up a military capacity which we'd ultimately never have been able to hold.

I'm always slightly surprised they never tried to launch such an invasion of Ireland, as had neither the population or military capacity to mount much of a defence and this would have gone along way to giving them parity, if not control of the Western Approaches making supply even harder, as well as diverting our finite defences all over Western England, Wales and Southern Scotland. They'd be no shortage of potential embarkation points in Ireland either, and you've got to think we'd be over stretched.
 
Originally posted by BrianH@Dec 14 2006, 03:00 PM
What saved us was Hitler's decision to start a second front in the east and postpone the invasion of Britain.
At face value history suggests you're right and many people often cite this as an error. I'm not so sure Barborosa was a mistake in terms of doing what he did, when he did, and you could argue it was the logical continuation of the war. It was a calculated gamble based on an appraisal of how things were likely to pan out in the future, and to no small extent Hitler's hand was forced.

That the Soviets were able to move about 1500 key factories thousands of miles and have them in full production within weeks of dismantling and rebuilding them, was critical. As was the fact that Leningrad held in the Winter of 1941/42 in what was probably the single biggest sacrifical show of resistance in the whole war. Moscow despite teetering also held after it was reinforced by specialist winter troops when Stalin discovered that the Japanese had no immediate desires on Manchuria and were looking instead, across the Pacific. Quite understandably, he chose not to share this intelligence.

I tend to think that Hitler recognising that American entry was inevitable at some point in the future, and that they would present a much more formidable opponent than a defeated France, and bottled up Britain, both of whom presented no unilateral threat, meant that he knew he'd need an oil supply. The Winters war with Finland had demonstrated that the Red Army wasn't as powerful as he might have assessed them to be, and the timing looked right to 'have ago'. To get to the oil fields he needed to crash across the Soviet Union though.

Had Moscow and Leningrad fallen in 1941, and had he succeeded in destroying huge tracts of Soviet productive capacity he might just have done it. It was a gamble that the fortitude of the Soviets largely thwarted in the Winter of 1941 but even in the Spring of 1942 the Germans had crossed the Don and reached the Volga by late Summer. That Stalin had renamed the city, and Hitler became increasingly fixated on its symbolism, was perhaps the error? The pocket that the Red Army defended on West bank of the Volga was periously small at times, but all this time of course had allowed Soviet industry to out produce the Germans in thinks like Tanks. I think they out putted 20 T34's to every 1 'Tiger'. By the time the Germans were defeated at Stalingrad, and they squared up at Kursk, the war of attrition had swung in Stalins favour, and although Soviet losses were still higher, it was clear that the Germans would run out first.

Was the mistake therefore the decision? or was the mistake the prosecution? Or was it simply down to beligerent defence the likes of which might not reasonably have been foreseen? To some extent of course Hitler might have been vinidcated, as 6 months after Barborosa the USA were indeed in the war, had he suceeded in getting through to the oil fields in the Winter of 1941-42 we might have had a different outcome in Europe? That he got bogged down, and never really got to plunder the fuel to sustain and grow his industries is as much as what saved us I think too.

Mind you that drags us into nuclear territory, as to how things would have panned out etc
 
It seems your % for France is pretty much spot on Brian, which I confess surprises me, as I'd often read and heard far worse estimates; but your % for Belgium is an underestimate. It's hard to find reliable data on the web, but I did bring up this page - which is part of the Anti-Defamation League site - with book refs [numbers in square brackets, titles below] after a bit of googling around:


<< While exact numbers of the killed are elusive and existing estimates ought to be viewed with caution, they do point to an unprecedented human destruction. Prewar Europe had a Jewish population of a little less than 9 million. Initial estimates of the Jews killed during World War II amounted to 5.7 million. These figures had come from the 1945 Nuremberg trials. More recent estimates fluctuate between 5 and 6 million, with most sources citing the 6 million figure, or 67 percent.

In Nazi-occupied Europe, the prewar Jewish child population came to about 1.6 million. Of the 6 million Jews killed, there were an estimated 1.5 million children, leaving only 6 to 7 percent of them alive at the end of the war. If to this group of child survivors are added children who were repatriated after the war from the U.S.S.R. to Poland and Romania, then the number of child survivors rises to 170,000 or 11 percent. [3]

Even with this addition, the survival rate of children lags behind the survival rate of all the Jews, 11 percent children to 33 percent adults. Such differences are not surprising. Within the German plan of Jewish annihilation, children became special targets. Indeed, in line with these policies, upon reaching a concentration camp, all Jewish children were sent to their deaths. On rare occasions, a healthy-looking teenager slipped through the system. For example, from a French police roundup of Jews in July 1942, 9,000 were shipped to Auschwitz, the concentration camp in Poland. In this transport of 9,000, there were 4,000 children. After the war, of the entire group, only 30 returned. None were children. [4]

German preoccupation with the destruction of Jewish children suggests that most of the child survivors were hidden children. Efforts to protect Jewish children arose out of a battle between those who wanted to kill and those who wanted to save. It was an uneven struggle, a struggle that left many victims and very few survivors.

In every European country under German occupation, the survival rate of children was much lower than that of the overall Jewish population. Thus, prewar Poland had an estimated 1 million Jewish children. Of these children, from infancy to age 14, an estimated 5,000, or half a percent, made it till the end of the war. [5]

In Holland, Jews made up 1.6 percent of the Dutch population, which amounted to 140,000 individuals. They were relatively well integrated into the society. 6 Of the 140,000 Dutch Jews, an estimated 75 percent perished. Among the 35,000 survivors, 3,500 were children. [7]

In occupied Belgium, the German army was in charge of the country and not particularly eager to destroy the Jews. Nevertheless, the army complied with the Nazi plans and, by May 1942, it began transporting Belgian Jews to concentration camps in Poland. [8] At the end of the war, of the 65,000 Belgian Jews, about 40 percent had survived. Among them were 3,000 children. [9]

The situation in France was different from that of the other European countries. The Germans divided France into an occupied and an unoccupied zone. The unoccupied section had a French government known as the Vichy government. Not directly under German control, the Vichy government was unusual. Of all the Western European countries, it alone initiated and adopted virulent anti-Semitic policies. [10]

In the occupied part of France, the French police were very active in rounding up Jews. Specifically too, the French police took the initiative in allocating Jewish children to convoys that were leaving for the Auschwitz concentration camp. [11]

Out of 350,000 French Jews, an estimated 90,000, or 26 percent, were killed. Figures for child survivors range from 5,000 to 15,000, with most of them identified as orphans. [12] >>


Refs:
3. Deborah Dwork, Children With a Star (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 174-175 in note 27; Mordechai Paldiel, "The Rescue of Jewish Children in Poland and the Netherlands," in Alice L. Eckardt, ed., Burning Memory: Times of Testing and Reckoning (New York: Pergamon Press, 1993), p. 120. 4. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 (New York: Holt, Rinehardt and Winston, 1975), p. 362. 5. Dwork, Children With a Star, pp. 274-275, in note 27. 6. Henry L. Mason, "Jews in the Occupied Netherlands," Political Science Quarterly 99, no. 2 (Summer 1984): pp. 330-339. 7. Lucy S. Dawidowicz, The War Against the Jews, 1933-1945 p. 403; Josef Michman, "The Problem of the Jewish War Orphans in Holland," in She'e Rit Hapletah, 1944-1948, Rehabilitation & Struggle (Jerusalem: Yad Vashem, 1990), p. 190. 8. Hilberg, The Destruction of European Jews, p. 382-390. 9. Philip Friedman, Their Brothers' Keepers (New York: Holocaust Library, 1978), p. 69. 10. Michael R. Marrus and Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France & the Jews (New York: Schocken Books, 1983), p. 359. 11. Ibid., p. 265. 12. David Weinberg, "The Reconstruction of the French Jewish Community After World War II," in She'e Rit Hapletah, 1944-1948, pp. 172-173.
 
Remins us what a horrible place the world was such a short time ago. For much of europe, a choice between genocial Hitler and murdering Stalin.

The reason Hitler didnt invade via Ireland was again down to his hesitation at taking on the british, who he saw as racial "brothers" rather than the "slavs" who he simply hated. Every chance that he was as motivated by his prejudices as much as tactics

would have been interesting though. De Valera's reaction would have been what, i wonder?
 
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Problem with any of the points made then simmo?

very strange...nothing unusual there at all

De Valera's views on Hitler are no real secret but certainly not shared across all of ireland (which is why so many fought for the UK forces)
 
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